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MEDIEVAL
Cambridge and its Economic Region, 1450–1560. Studies in Regional and Local His-
tory, volume 3. By John S. Lee. Hatfield: University of Hertfordshire Press, 2005. 
Pp. xviii, 238. £18.99, paper. 
Translating a Ph.D. dissertation into a book is no mean task, but John S. Lee has 
achieved the feat admirably. He sets out to examine “the relationship between a me-
dieval town and its hinterland” and to explore “the nature and extent of any changes 
that took place in these links between Cambridge and its region” (p. 1). To this end, 
the author has carefully probed the records of the borough and the university for the 
century spanning 1500, paying special attention to information relating to economy 
and society. There is a healthy balance between primary and secondary source mate-
rial, with the latter helping to contextualise the former. Even a cursory glance through 
the bibliography underlines the impressive number and variety of manuscript and pri-
mary printed sources consulted. The book is clearly and methodically presented, in an 
easy-to-read narrative way. It contains over forty figures, most of which supplement 
the text and help to articulate what a thousand words could not. 
In just two hundred pages, Lee covers a wide range of topics, including population, 
wealth, commerce, land, labor, wheat prices, supply and consumption of food and 
fuel, and university building projects. He shows how, in many respects, Cambridge 
was an ordinary mid-ranked English town in the middle ages, but how, in other ways, 
it was exceptional. For instance, while other urban centres experienced symbiosis be-
tween town and castle, in Cambridge the central relationship was between town and 
university. Indeed, in his chapter on “Cambridge and its society,” the author demon-
strates the mutual interdependence and complex alliances that existed between town 
and gown, and shows that these bodies were not as polarized as many people might 
have believed. 
The greatest strength of this book, however, is its analysis of the town’s commercial 
hinterland. It provides a particularly adept analysis of the geography of the town’s 
trade and a comprehensive reconstruction of its marketing network. Although there 
was a general trend of population decline in Cambridge from 1377 to 1524, numbers 
remained at between 4,000 and 5,000 for most of the middle ages (pp. 28–30). Lee 
demonstrates that throughout this time “for many economic purposes, the town was 
served by its local region of about 10 to 15 miles in radius” (pp. 6, 7). In this regard, 
Lee’s diagrammatic representations, using five- and ten-mile concentric circles, illus-
trate just how restricted the economic hinterland of Cambridge was (pp. 87, 99, 156, 
157, 158, 159). The point is made, however, that between 1450 and 1560 at least, this 
local hinterland was just one of “three inter-connecting regions linked to the town”—
the others being “a regional hinterland stretching to just over 50 miles away, and more 
distant ties with other urban centres” (p. 203). Lower value consumables generally 
came from closer to the town, with more expensive goods being transported over 
greater distances (p. 172). In time, the colleges at Cambridge appear to have had to 
look further afield for charcoal and firewood (p. 159)—supplies closer to the town 
may have been exhausted as forest was felled to make way for food crops. 
Having outlined the nature and extent of Cambridge’s interconnecting economic re-
gions, Lee concludes by suggesting that the hinterland of most English towns in the 
middle ages was more restricted than might be assumed. He concludes the book by 
saying that “concepts that stress the role of towns as promoters of economic activity 
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can be useful in identifying areas of growth, and particularly in highlighting the influ-
ence of London, but the size of most medieval towns in England restricted their impact 
on surrounding regions” (p. 204). 
MICHAEL POTTERTON, The Discovery Programme, Dublin, Ireland
EUROPE 
The Political Economy of Stalinism: Evidence from the Soviet Secret Archives. By 
Paul R. Gregory. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004. Pp. xi, 308. $90, 
cloth; $32, paper. 
Paul Gregory’s very fine study of the Stalinist political economy represents some-
thing of an autopsy report of the Soviet Union as an experiment in socialist economy. 
Gregory has worked primarily with archive materials, located both in Moscow and in 
microfilm form at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University. The archival collec-
tions include those of the Council of People’s Commissars (Sovnarkom), the industrial 
ministries, the Central Control Commission of the Central Committee, and the Gulag. 
One of the many strengths of this book is that Gregory, the leading active American 
economic historian of the Soviet Union, grappled with the problem of the Soviet 
command economy for the better part of 25 years before the opening of the archives. 
He is therefore in an excellent position to know precisely what the archival documents 
can tell us that we did not know before.  
In the preface, Gregory states that “I regard the Soviet Union’s experience with the 
planned socialist system as the most important social, political, and economic experi-
ment of the twentieth century” (pp. ix–x). Clearly believing that a successful socialist 
economy was impossible to achieve, he views the Soviet economic project as a colos-
sal failure, with serious consequences that reverberate to the present day for many of 
the world’s planned systems. 
Gregory frames his study by revisiting a question posed by Joseph Berliner: Did the 
system fail because of a bad jockey (incompetent leaders and irrational policies, with 
Stalin as “the principal architect”) or an inferior horse (the socialist economic ar-
rangements themselves)? The book addresses this question by reconstructing “how the 
system really worked, both formally and informally” (p. 5), which is by itself a very 
impressive accomplishment. Gregory, agreeing with F. A. Hayek, rejects the jockey 
explanation, arguing that the command economy could only be managed in the 
framework of a “totalitarian” dictatorship. Another leader might not have shed as 
much blood as Stalin, but the system nevertheless required an authoritarian leader and 
the bludgeoning of any semblance of party democracy. Moving away from a Stalin 
centric approach, Gregory highlights the multiple layers of “little Stalins” at work 
throughout the planning and economic bureaucracies. He calls this a system of nested 
dictatorship: petty local autocrats with unlimited coercive authority but with loyalties 
to their shifting offices that enabled the system to function. The individuals who actu-
ally led economic institutions had little importance in this system; bureaucrats’ agen-
das changed to fit the agency’s interests, but they themselves were largely inter-
changeable.  
One of the book’s major contributions is to illustrate how constrained Stalin and the 
Politburo actually were when it came to decisions about the economy. Apart from 
grain collections, foreign exchange, and the investment budget, nearly all decisions 
about resource allocation were made by subordinates at lower levels. The Politburo 
Book Reviews 831 
chafed about the extent to which decision making was decentralized; it attempted to 
reserve more decisions for itself, often through force. This state of affairs contributed 
to the highly inefficient state of the economy, as Moscow forced local managers to do 
things they knew were ill planned, irrational, and counter to the information they had 
at their disposal. Failure to fulfill central orders could mean the loss of one’s job and 
arrest, placing local officials in an utterly impossible situation. In fact, even as the re-
gime established the general economic goals it also tolerated informal forms of ex-
change and shadow market activity among managers. 
Gregory also seeks to highlight the surprising persistence of the administrative-
command system after Stalin’s death. (Gregory chooses to employ the phrase “admin-
istrative-command” rather than the more commonly used “command-administrative” 
system). The mistrust between Moscow leaders and local managers remained after 
1953, even growing more heated. Demands for more leeway in using knowledge of 
local conditions were countered by Moscow’s accusations of local corruption, greed, 
and disinformation. Gregory concludes that stasis in this system was inevitable and 
served to perpetuate the system until its collapse. Without real markets or the power to 
make decisions, managers could not act on their access to superior knowledge. More-
over, very few rules actually governed the system, apart from the general notion that 
one year’s priorities, never explicitly stated in any case, would remain priorities the 
following year. The initial enthusiasm of the first five-year plans dissipated quickly as 
the plans in action began to seem irrational, confusing, and contradictory. 
Read in conjunction with the work of social and political historians of the Stalinist 
police-state and industrial economy, such as David Shearer, Oleg Khlevniuk, and 
Mark Harrison, this excellent history of the Stalinist economy greatly expands our 
knowledge while opening doors to future research. 
JAMES HEINZEN, Rowan University 
Nathan Mayer Rothschild and the Creation of a Dynasty: The Critical Years, 1806–
1816. By Herbert H. Kaplan. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2006. 
Pp. xvii, 194. $45. 
Any attempt to illuminate the history of Mayer Amschel Rothschild and his descen-
dants is fraught with peril. The stories already planted by historians and others about 
what may have been the most important family in European finance during the nine-
teenth century are legion. Moreover, these stories are ground well-overgrown by hardy 
weeds of myth, themselves well-fertilized by the constraints of available archival 
sources. With Nathan Mayer Rothschild and the Creation of a Dynasty, however, 
Herbert H. Kaplan, professor emeritus of history at Indiana University, avoids the per-
ils. The volume will be valuable not only for his fellow Rothschild scholars but for 
anyone with an interest in the financial history of the Napoleonic period or in the de-
velopment of nineteenth-century financial institutions.  
Kaplan dispels various Rothschild myths, such as the long-standing one that had 
Nathan supplementing his business capital with the dowry of his wife, Hannah Cohen 
(pp. 9–10). He also offers a method for separating myth from actual history within the 
context of an extremely complicated network of business relationships. Though he 
admits the book is neither a biography of Nathan nor a history of the Rothschild fam-
ily (p. xx), making its title a slight misnomer—Creation of a Dynasty: Nathan . . . , 
1806–1816 might be more accurate—Kaplan’s approach may be far more valuable 
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than either. Painstakingly piecing together sketchy details from personal and business 
correspondence, Kaplan takes us transaction by transaction through the decade that 
saw Nathan Rothschild progress from a merchant whose character contemporaries 
viewed as questionable to a banker at the center of a financial network vital to British 
political and military success. He teases out one new detail after another from previ-
ously unresearched archives on both sides of the Channel, most notably from the 
Rothschild Archive and the John Charles Herries Papers at the British Library.  
By themselves, Kaplan’s new sources make the book worthy of an extended look. 
Even more important, however, is how Kaplan illuminates these sources. Nathan 
Mayer Rothschild was a man who regularly eschewed careful bookkeeping. Indeed, 
relatives and associates complained throughout to Nathan about sloppy, contradictory, 
even ethically suspect, records. Moreover, the decade saw him involved in a dizzying 
number of partnerships, associations, and “arrangements” with his father, brothers, 
and associates. Kaplan, however, shows the accounting instincts of a tax auditor as he 
follows and reconstructs Nathan’s transaction trail. And as the trail leads from days 
where Nathan was mistrusted by almost everyone in Manchester, through years of es-
tablishing his reputation by successful specie and bullion smuggling, to the late Napo-
leonic period where Nathan and his brothers interacted multiple times a day with ma-
jor players in war finance such as Herries, the British Commissary-in-Chief, one gains 
new insight into the family’s success.  
What of negatives? Had I had Professor Kaplan’s ear when he was completing the 
final draft, I would have made two suggestions. First, and more importantly, I would 
have asked for a book 25–30 pages longer. The book seems too short, not because it 
contains too little information but because it contains so much. Stories of accounting 
and finance by their nature require great precision in both quantitative and verbal dic-
tion, and Kaplan is a very precise writer. Generally, the book flows quite well—unlike 
the typical tax auditor, Kaplan is good at making the technical part of the story acces-
sible. Occasionally, however, his precise diction turns dense, assuming more technical 
understanding than his intended audience may have. The book’s introduction and con-
clusion are outstanding in outlining his argument, but a reader—particularly a nonspe-
cialist, or one whose understanding of how the record-keeping underpinning the in-
come statement and balance sheet actually works might be a bit sketchy—may 
occasionally get bogged down in other parts of the book. Adding a page or two here, a 
paragraph or a sentence there, of explanation—connecting the particular details to a 
larger balance sheet story or a supply and demand/agency costs story, say—would 
have made the detail more accessible to those of us less adept in “following the money 
trail.”
Second, a list or diagram of dramatis personae would have helped. “Keeping the 
names straight” can daunt nonspecialist readers; so, preceding his text with an anno-
tated list of the players in the story would have been as helpful to them as his six-page 
list of abbreviations will be for specialists using his voluminous endnotes. Similarly, a 
summary diagram or three setting out the various Rothschild and Rothschild-
connected partnerships would have been invaluable: as Kaplan shows, the network of 
Rothschild business associations, even between 1806 and 1816, was complex indeed. 
Be clear, however, this is an important book. In telling the story of Nathan Mayer 
Rothschild it is tempting to succumb to one of two hackneyed stories. One can point to 
the amoral, even unethical, opportunist. Nathan was not a man who mellowed between 
1806 and 1816; he remained willing to disregard anything and everything (careful re-
cord keeping, the law, the good opinion of father, brothers, or associates) that got in 
the way of the success of his business. Or one can tell the story of an entrepreneurial 
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risk-taker, a person who saw opportunities better than everyone else and then focused 
all his attention on building networks to take advantage of these opportunities. But 
though each caricature may contain part of the story, Kaplan’s work here makes clear 
that it is only a small part. The history of the Rothschild dynasty remains a story with 
many complexities unexplored. Nathan Mayer Rothschild and the Creation of a Dy-
nasty provides us with a model for further exploration. 
WADE SHILTS, Luther College
Exceptionalism and Industrialization: Britain and its European Rivals, 1688–1815.
Edited by Leandro Prados de la Escosura. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2004. Pp. xv, 335. $95. 
1
“When traveling should you eat the local specialties?” A widely circulated eco-
nomic theorem in the United States asserts “No”. If the local specialty was any good, 
it would be available everywhere. (This perhaps explains why American economists 
have an international, and not just a national, reputation for dullness). A lesser known 
corollary amongst academics similarly answers “Should you read Festschrifts?” with 
“No, anything good in them is available elsewhere.” Given the incentives of academic 
life, contributors have an unfortunate motive to deliver what is on the menu elsewhere, 
or to offer from the larder something that for good reason has been long lying on the 
bottom shelf untouched. 
It is thus a mark of the esteem with which Patrick O’Brien is held by his students 
and colleagues that this volume, though of variable quality, contains interesting pieces 
of original research that are unique to this outlet. The 13 contributions each give at 
least lip service to detailing what allowed Britain to achieve the great lead in industri-
alization by 1815. But the diversity of answers reveals once again just how mysterious 
the Industrial Revolution is, and how little hope there seems at present of a convincing 
answer to the questions “Why Britain? Why 1770?” The papers are loosely organized 
into six sections labeled respectively: the origins of British primacy, agriculture and 
industrialization, technological change, institutions and growth, war and hegemony, 
and conclusions. 
This reviewer found the pieces on agriculture and technology the most informative 
and thought provoking. Nick Crafts and Knick Harley, for example, employ their CGE 
model of the English Industrial Revolution to ask what explains England’s unusually 
low share of employment in agriculture by 1841. Was it population growth, agricul-
tural productivity gains, or the peculiar institutional structures of English agriculture? 
Their conclusion vindicates a long-held position of Patrick O’Brien and Caglar  
Kaydar, that England’s labor productivity advantage in the nineteenth century lay 
more in agriculture than in industry. Crafts and Harley argue that had two-thirds of 
English land remained farmed by peasant farmers, as they assume was the case in 
1770, then the share of labor in agriculture in 1841 would have been 47 percent in-
stead of 22 percent. This assumption has a large effect on employment in agriculture 
because it implies that two-thirds of all land rents in 1841 were (counterfactually) al-
located to subsidizing workers to stay in agriculture. 
This conclusion seems, to say the least, a little suspect. Already by 1770 English 
farmland was mainly owned by large owners and rented out for cash rents at market 
1 This review appeared on EH.Net in a slightly different version, copyright © EH.Net. Re-
printed by permission. 
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rates to cultivators, who paid the rents to the landlords and not to surplus relatives with 
low value to their labor time on the farm. And there are strong indications that labor 
productivity in English agriculture was already high by European standards in 1770 
before the Industrial Revolution was under way. But agree or disagree, anyone inter-
ested in these issues will want to read this piece. 
James Simpson, in another piece original to this volume, also supports the 
O’Brien/Kaydar hypothesis through a consideration of the details of English agricul-
ture versus that of its continental competitors. This piece again offers a fresh perspec-
tive on much-debated issues. 
Three essays deal with the role of technological change. The first of these, by Chris-
tine MacLeod, though just a survey of technological developments and their institu-
tional structures in Britain and its competitors, is well executed and offers an excellent 
introduction to the subject. The main conclusion is that, if anything, institutions pro-
vided more incentives for innovation in France than in England in the eighteenth cen-
tury. The other pieces in this section by James Thompson and Rainer Fremdling, while 
not uninteresting, seem to get lost in the details of the innovations discussed and so to 
forget the larger question, “Why was Britain different?” 
The sections on institutions and war appeared to me less rewarding. Another version 
of the “restaurant theorem” above is the following: “Can local institutions explain the 
success of particular economies? No, because if any local institution was particularly 
valuable it would have been copied everywhere.” The authors of these sections seem 
not to have taken on board this maxim, and attribute wonderful powers to the most 
mundane institutional differences. Every difference between England and less success-
ful economies is taken as evidence of the true power and wonder of institutions. No 
matter how trivial these differences might appear, or how little advance theory there is 
of what Industrial Revolution-producing institutions look like, the writers have faith 
they matter. Money, banks, government bonds, taxes, naval organization—did any of 
these make the British Industrial Revolution? To a skeptic it all seems on a par with 
those fervent believers who see Weeping Madonnas in tree stumps. But with belief 
every institution becomes wondrous. 
GREGORY CLARK, University of California, Davis
LATIN AMERICA 
Chimneys in the Desert: Industrialization in Argentina during the Export Boom Years, 
1870–1930. By Fernando Rocchi. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2005. 
Pp. xviii, 394. $70. 
2
Argentina’s inability to sustain the prosperity that, in the late 1920s, made it one of 
the richest countries in the world has led to much speculation about the causes of that 
failure. Many have placed a good deal of the blame on Argentina’s failure to create a 
self-sustaining process of industrialization. However, as Fernando Rocchi points out in 
the book under review, there have been few modern systematic studies of the early 
stages of industrialization. Many commentators have just accepted the view, princi-
pally put forward by the industrialists, that early industrialization occurred in a largely 
hostile environment: the primary providers of credit, the state-owned banks, proving 
unwilling to grant loans and the state offering little or no tariff protection.  
2 Copyright © EH.Net. Reprinted by permission. 
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Rocchi sets out to shift this vision. His work is wide ranging, well written, and highly 
perceptive. An impressive array of sources includes, but is not limited to, company and 
bank records and diplomatic archives. Given the state of the archives and libraries, this 
is an extraordinary accomplishment. Often showing how individual companies operated, 
the author gives a micro-level view as well analyzing the larger trends. 
As Rocchi points out, Argentine industrialization departed from the classical model, 
because the country had little in the way of an artisanal tradition. Most of its skilled 
workers were immigrants. For Rocchi the key hindrance to industrialization lay in the 
small size of the market, which prevented achievement of the efficiency needed to win 
markets abroad. Rapid population growth, the creation of a national market, and a cul-
ture of consumption could not overcome lack of scale. Argentina also lacked key in-
puts such as coal and iron and had relatively high labor costs. 
Rocchi argues, quite convincingly, that industrialization was not constrained by the 
inability to obtain capital from the state-controlled banks. Using the archives of the 
Banco de la Nación and the Banco de la Provincia de Buenos Aires, he demonstrates 
that numerous large and medium-sized companies did receive loans from state con-
trolled banks. Companies also raised money on the stock market. He does argue, how-
ever, that self financing, which was very common, may have been the best strategy 
given the volatility of consumer demand, dependent on foreign purchases of Argentine 
exports. However, Rocchi does not really demonstrate that consumer demand was se-
riously less dependable than in other countries.  
How much tariff protection industry enjoyed is difficult to demonstrate, given the 
complex way rates were calculated, but Rocchi makes clear that industrial production 
was frequently sheltered by either protective or revenue tariffs. Arguments in Con-
gress show that critical support existed for the idea of protecting industry. Clearly, the 
conditions for industrialization were much more complex than has usually been 
thought, and it would be difficult simply to dismiss them as hostile. 
Rocchi has larger goals than just showing the beginnings of industrialization. He 
devotes a well-crafted chapter to the creation of a consumer society in Buenos Aires, 
one which in many ways resembled that of the contemporary North Atlantic world, 
with department stores and the like. Harrods, the well known English department 
store, even had a branch in Buenos Aires. The author also includes a chapter on how 
Buenos Aires–based firms created national markets for themselves, intensifying the 
central role of the city in the Argentine economy. Large firms were created, as were 
trusts. Rocchi also discusses how conflict with the labor force helped forge coopera-
tion between industrialists. 
The picture that Rocchi gives us is that of a rather dynamic manufacturing sector that 
responded relatively well to growing demands but was limited by the size and nature of 
the economy. This is a generally persuasive argument but not one without flaws. The au-
thor is at times somewhat too determined to claim originality for his arguments. He 
clearly builds on others, and although he has made by far the best case for his ideas, at 
times he does not give these others all their due. More importantly, although the book 
purports to cover the period from 1870 to 1930, it distinctly slights the period after the 
first fair presidential election in 1916. We therefore lack a full discussion of the impacts 
of World War I and of the 1920s. In the latter period the nature of industrialization shifted 
due to the intensification of direct investment by foreign firms, particularly from the 
United States. If one is going to make arguments about the nature of industrialization just 
prior to the Great Depression, it would be helpful to know more about these changes.  
Despite these caveats, Fernando Rocchi has given us an excellent work that re-
shapes our vision of early industrialization in Argentina. It also helps us to understand 
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some of the innate problems of the economy and shows why some later prescriptions 
for the economy did not solve its problems. Like all good books, this should inspire 
further research. Anyone interested in the problematic history of the Argentine econ-
omy will find it a stimulating and convincing work. 
JOEL HOROWITZ, St. Bonaventure University 
NORTH AMERICA 
The Economy of Early America: Historical Perspectives and New Directions. Edited 
by Cathy Matson. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2006. 
Pp. viii, 380. $55. 
Writing about the shortcomings in historical and economic analysis is never easy, par-
ticularly when examining 20 years of research. Cathy Matson does well as editor of a 
volume that collects together papers presented at a conference sponsored by the Pro-
gram in Early American Economy and Society (PEAES). The conference was titled 
“The Past and the Future of Early American Economic History: Needs and Opportuni-
ties,” and it examined research in early American economic history since 1985, which 
coincides with the first publication of John McCusker and Russell Menard’s seminal 
work The Economy of British America, 1697–1789 (Chapel Hill: University of North 
Carolina Press, 1985). The theme “needs and opportunities” repeats the subtitle from 
McCusker and Menard, making clear the connection in the essayists’ intentions. Each 
essay is thoroughly researched and discusses the good and bad aspects of the current 
state of research and potentially promising directions for future work. As the title of the 
book suggests, the essays are more inclined to start debate on an issue than to end it. 
Matson starts the volume with a historiographical essay detailing the intellectual 
development of economic history and the eventual split between econometrically ori-
ented research and a more thematic cultural approach (pp. 5–11). It is a rich story re-
peated in the essays by David Hancock, Russell Menard, and Lorena Walsh. There is 
no formal plea for renewed cooperation but the need for reconciliation to advance the 
field is abundantly clear. Matson’s introduction to early American economic history 
covers 100 years of research prior to 1985. She then examines the field after 1985, do-
ing a wonderful job pointing out the rich opportunities that still exist for research as 
she provides context for each of the book’s chapters.  
Hancock, Menard, and Walsh’s essays point to the need for renewed discussion and 
debate as well as the need for a more integrated economic history combining research 
into cultural institutions and characteristics with rigorous statistical investigation. 
Hancock reflects on the 20 years since McCusker and Menard’s book and how closely 
the discipline followed the agenda they set out. He finds that many of the questions set 
forth in 1985 still lack answers, particularly the central questions of growth and devel-
opment in the colonial times and the early republic. Historians branched out to other 
topics, not less interesting or worthy of study, but pushing us further away from an in-
tegrated economic history of early America. Menard illustrates the need for integration 
of many fields when he discusses agricultural practices and performance in the colo-
nies. It is not possible to reasonably discuss agricultural productivity growth without 
also discussing labor markets and practices, capital formation, land policy, migration 
and other demographic measures, and a host of other factors. Walsh develops a similar 
idea in her essay on population issues, pointing to the lack of advancement in the es-
timation of early population figures particularly for the African and African American 
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segments of the Chesapeake and goes so far as to speculate why some issues remain 
unresolved: the decline of large scale collaborative projects (p. 125). 
Brooke Hunter’s essay on the Hessian fly highlights the lack of environmental eco-
nomic history for this time period. The cyclical response of environment to economy 
and economy to environment receives insufficient attention in the literature currently 
and is another important part of an integrated examination of productivity and entre-
preneurship in early America. Entrepreneurial activity takes center stage in Donna 
Rilling’s essay on the building trade and the efforts of builders to become self suffi-
cient and wealthy. Rilling’s essay highlights the intersections of real estate markets, 
financial markets and labor markets in Philadelphia at this time and the need for inte-
gration of these topics by researchers.  
Seth Rockman, David Waldstreicher, and Christopher Tomlins provide excellent dis-
cussions of labor market issues. Rockman (p. 336) argues for a revision of the transition to 
capitalism literature recognizing better the role of “unfree labor” upon economic devel-
opment after the attainment of political independence. Waldstreicher points to the com-
plex influences working on Benjamin Franklin’s thoughts on slavery and how his position 
changed over time. Tomlins (p. 147) argues for a reassessment of our thinking about the 
role of “migrant servitude” in the colonial labor force and therefore later institutional de-
velopments. Their contributions point to a significant need for altering the involvement of 
slaves and indentured servants in the political economy of the early republic.  
Terry Bouton, Daniel Dupre, and John Majewski focus on monetary and financial 
matters in their essays. Bouton provides a different view of monetary development in 
the early republic Pennsylvania arguing that privatization of currency provision exac-
erbated financial problems and did not improve economic performance as suggested in 
the recent literature. Dupre examines the rise of sectional and political tensions in the 
early republic drawing attention to the understudied Panic of 1819. Majewski argues 
for a reassessment of the “market revolution” in the early republic and an examination 
of political and social attitudes towards stock ownership, which was more widespread 
and more in demand than commonly believed.  
This book is a valuable first step towards reinvigorating debate and investigation 
into the economy in early America. It contains challenging restatements and reinter-
pretations of major issues in the early formation and development of the United States. 
Although each essay represents an independently rich and complex story, we are better 
served by recognizing the larger need for a more unified narrative that cuts across re-
gions and markets, and ultimately disciplines, and recognizes the interrelatedness of 
these ideas. In the end, this book may meet one of the Hancock’s (p. 95) aims for fur-
ther research: scholars may adopt the attitude of McCusker and Menard and become 
more open to a variety of research from diverse disciplines and start drawing together 
this wider literature into a unified theme. 
DAVID T. FLYNN, University of North Dakota
The First Wall Street: Chestnut Street, Philadelphia, and the Birth of American Finance.
By Robert E. Wright. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005. Pp. vii, 210. $25. 
The First Wall Street examines the role that Chestnut Street, the financial district of 
Philadelphia, played in promoting economic growth and development in the early 
United States from the American Revolution until the Civil War. The monograph 
builds on a large theoretical and empirical literature in economics and finance that 
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analyzes the relationship between the financial sector and economic growth, the so 
called finance-growth nexus. This literature suggests that financial institutions and in-
novations reduce frictions and channel savings to their most highly valued use. A large 
number of empirical studies find that countries with larger financial sectors and better 
financial institutions have faster economic growth and greater economic development.  
Unlike most studies, Robert Wright employs the historical approach—as opposed to 
a statistical one—to examine the importance of the financial sector in the early United 
States. The author examines how financiers and the development of financial institu-
tions and innovations in Philadelphia promoted economic development in early Amer-
ica. The book is divided into 11 chapters that examine various aspects of the financial 
sector and their importance for stimulating economic activity in the late eighteenth 
century and antebellum period.  
In chapter 1, Wright introduces his hypothesis that a well-developed financial sector 
is a necessary component of modern economic growth. Chapter 2 notes that Philadel-
phia was America’s most important financial center in the colonial and antebellum pe-
riods. Philadelphia had a well-developed securities market, in addition to banks and 
insurance companies, even in the colonial period. The City of Brotherly Love there-
fore played an important role in financing early American economic growth. In chap-
ter 3, Wright discusses the financial legacy of the American Revolution and how the 
Constitution laid the foundation for a “financial revolution” in the United States.  
The next several chapters discuss various aspects of the American financial revolu-
tion. Chapter 4 reviews the establishment of a stable monetary system with the U.S. 
dollar as a unit of account. Wright also discusses at some length the construction and 
establishment of a Federal mint in Philadelphia. In the following chapter, he reviews 
some of Hamilton’s innovative financial plans including the establishment of the Bank 
of the United States. Chapter 6 details the rise of the insurance business and how fami-
lies hedged against costly economic events. Chapters 7 and 8 show how early credit 
markets financed the building of homes in Philadelphia and the construction of roads, 
canals, and railroads in the first half of the nineteenth century. Chapters 8 through 11 
discuss the decline of Chestnut Street and the rise of New York as America’s premier 
financial center. Wright argues that Philadelphia became overshadowed by New York 
for several reasons, including the demise of the Second Bank of the United States and 
the death of important businessmen from Philadelphia. 
The First Wall Street is an interesting and informative account of the role of the fi-
nancial sector in promoting economic growth in early America. Arguably, the most 
important contribution of this monograph is the use of the historical approach that 
provides the reader with a series of stories about financiers and financial innovations 
in early America. The historical accounts directly show how a financial sector can 
promote economic development and growth. The historical approach can be more 
stimulating and convincing than empirical studies of the finance-growth nexus that 
suffer from two serious identification problems: does finance cause growth or does 
growth cause the financial sector to expand?; and what is the appropriate metric to 
measure the size and growth of the financial sector? Economists typically address the 
chicken and egg problem by using instrumental variables or arguing that the financial 
sector leads economic growth in a time-series regression. As for the second question, 
empirical studies of the finance-growth nexus often employ the inverse of monetary 
velocity or the ratio of liquid assets to the size of the economy as proxies for financial 
development. Although these statistical remedies and proxies have some validity, it is 
probably the case that the financial sector causes growth and vice-versa and that there 
is not a really good way to quantitatively measure the depth and quality of the finan-
Book Reviews 839 
cial sector. The novelty of The First Wall Street is that Wright uses history to identify 
the linkages between finance and growth over a long period of time. This is probably a 
more credible identification strategy.  
There are some minor shortcomings in the monograph. The author could have 
placed greater emphasis on the idea that the historical approach is a very important 
tool to study the finance-growth nexus given the endogeneity problems in modern 
studies. The finance-growth nexus is a good example where economic historians and 
historians can make a significant contribution to a larger audience. Articulating this 
point in a concise manner could have potentially widened the interest and contribution 
of the monograph. The book could have benefited from some tables on the growth and 
size of the Philadelphia stock market. The author could have compared these figures 
with data from the New York Stock Exchange and maybe some of the other regional 
markets. The inclusion of a table and discussion that show the rise and decline of 
Chestnut Street along with the ascendancy of New York as the nation’s premier finan-
cial center would have strengthened the historical approach.  
Overall, The First Wall Street is a well-written and researched monograph. Wright 
provides a detailed overview of the importance of early financial institutions and fi-
nanciers in Philadelphia that promoted economic development in early America. The 
author’s use of the historical narrative sidesteps the endogeneity issues that plague 
many of the recent empirical studies on the finance-growth nexus. This book is likely 
to be of interest to economic and financial historians with an interest in the role that 
the financial sector played in promoting economic development in early America. 
Mainstream economists who have an interest in the chicken and egg problem would 
probably also find the book an interesting read.  
MARC D. WEIDENMIER, Claremont McKenna College
Planting a Capitalist South: Masters, Merchants, and Manufacturers in the Southern 
Interior, 1790–1860. By Tom Downey. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University 
Press, 2006. Pp. xiii, 262. $49.95. 
In 1965 Eugene D. Genovese ignited a debate over the character of slave-based so-
ciety in the American South with his declaration that “the planters were not mere capi-
talists; they were precapitalist, quasi-aristocratic landowners . . . [whose] society, in its 
spirit and fundamental direction, represented the antithesis of capitalism, however 
many compromises it had to make” (The Political Economy of Slavery: Studies in the 
Economy and Society of the Slave South. New York: Knopf, 1965: 23). Genovese’s 
larger purpose was not simply taxonomic, but to argue that long-term conflict between 
North and South was indeed irrepressible.  
Genovese’s characterization sparked a paradoxical dispute. His original challenge ul-
timately boiled down to a stale battle of definitions: if “capitalism” meant an economy 
based on the exploitation of waged labor then slavery obviously fell short, but if the 
term applied to any acquisitive economy based on markets and private property, then 
slavery qualified, along with most other systems. Few U.S. historians would accept the 
Marxist categories and analysis that Genovese then employed and most rejected his 
characterization of the South as “precapitalist” (See James Oakes. The Ruling Race: A 
History of American Slaveholders. New York: Knopf, 1982). But thanks in part to his 
prodding, specialists also tend to agree that the antebellum North and South were both 
very similar and very different, so much so that their conflict now seems much more “ir-
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repressible” than it did 40 years ago. Whether it was capitalist or not, for example, slav-
ery clearly made an enormous difference in the ways that northern and southern voters 
interpreted core common values such as liberty and equality, and those differences were 
strong enough to drive both sides to arms (See for example James M. McPherson. Battle 
Cry of Freedom: The Civil War Era. New York: Oxford University Press, 1988: vii–viii. 
J. Mills Thornton III. Politics and Power in a Slave Society: Alabama, 1800–1860. Ba-
ton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1978: 456–61). 
The original debate over southern capitalism has thus lost much of its force in re-
cent years, but has not disappeared entirely. Economic historians continue to discuss 
how slavery may have affected the relative economic strengths of the North and South 
in the Civil War, and how the legacy of slavery may have shaped the South’s long 
postwar poverty (see Peter A. Coclanis. The Shadow of a Dream: Economic Life and 
Death in the South Carolina Low Country, 1670–1920. New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1989: 111–60. Fred Bateman and Thomas Weiss. A Deplorable Scarcity: The 
Failure of Industrialization in the Slave Economy. Chapel Hill: The University of 
North Carolina Press, 1981. Gavin Wright. The Political Economy of the Cotton 
South: Households, Markets, and Wealth in the Nineteenth Century. New York: Nor-
ton, 1978). At the same time, other historians have come to believe that a simple 
“capitalist” label may also violate the complicated reality of the northern economy in 
this period, and speak of a “transition to capitalism” during the first half of the nine-
teenth century (for example, see Charles Sellers. The Market Revolution: Jacksonian 
America, 1815–1846. New York: Oxford University Press, 1991). 
In effect, our understanding of the northern and southern economies has come to paral-
lel what we know about northern and southern politics and culture: both were similar in 
important ways and also significantly different. The most recent literature tends to avoid 
broad-brush generalizations in favor of fine-grained studies of local conditions and nu-
anced descriptions of the distinctive character of all developments in the antebellum 
economy (e.g., Christopher Clark. The Roots of Rural Capitalism: Western Massachu-
setts, 1780–1860. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1990. Charles B. Dew. Bond of 
Iron: Master and Slave at Buffalo Forge. New York: W.W. Norton, 1994).  
Tom Downey’s Planting a Capitalist South is a thoughtful and well-researched con-
tribution to this recent literature. He begins by situating his work within the existing 
debate over southern capitalism, but disclaims any intention to settle that wide-ranging 
controversy. He desires instead to examine “the interaction of agrarian, commercial, 
and industrial capitalists” in one corner of the Old South and to see how that interac-
tion “shaped the local political economy and in whose favor” (p. 7). His geographical 
focus is on the Edgefield and Barnwell districts of South Carolina, two inland planta-
tion counties that were also home to substantial cotton factories that were some of the 
Old South’s largest industrial facilities. 
Downey immediately makes clear that South Carolina capitalism was thoroughly pro-
slavery and made no veiled or overt threats to the state’s institutions of human property 
and racial control. This much is consistent with Genovese’s original declaration (Politi-
cal Economy: 180–220). But neither were the region’s planters inherently hostile to eco-
nomic development. Prospering from the cotton boom of the early nineteenth century, 
they welcomed roads, bridges, ferries, and mills and even state-sponsorship of a market 
town at Hamburg to compete with Georgia’s Augusta. As one thing led to another, the 
new town spawned a railroad to Charleston, which in turn begat more rural stores and 
eventually a pair of major textile factories at Vaucluse and Graniteville. Like their post-
bellum counterparts, Edgefield and Barnwell planters initially agreed that factories 
could benefit the existing system by giving employment to needy white families and 
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strengthening the state in its growing rivalry with the North. They were later chagrined 
to discover that factories, towns, and a vigorous railroad corporation could successfully 
pursue their own rival interests in state government, sometimes over loud protests from 
the agrarian community. These clashing interests produced no epic showdowns between 
rival aspirants to hegemony, but seemed to push South Carolina towards an ordinary 
competition between rival sectors in a developing pluralistic society. 
Tom Downey has carefully traced the emergence of a commercial and industrial or-
der inside the world of South Carolina’s slave plantation economy. His findings sug-
gest that commercial and industrial institutions were more compatible with slavery 
than some have suggested, even though certain clashes were predictable. Although he 
does not claim to settle grand questions, Downey’s work certainly suggests that poli-
tics and culture had more immediate relevance to American sectionalism than irrecon-
cilable differences between the northern and southern economies.  
HARRY L. WATSON, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
Cora Wilson Stewart and Kentucky’s Moonlight Schools: Fighting for Literacy in 
America. By Yvonne Honeycutt Baldwin. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 
2006. Pp. ix, 248. $40. 
Cora Wilson Stewart (1875–1958) dedicated her life to promoting adult literacy. In 
her home state of Kentucky, she began the Moonlight School movement of the early 
twentieth century with the goal of eradicating illiteracy in a single generation. From 
diaries, correspondences, administrative records, Stewart’s own manuscripts, and a 
wealth of secondary sources, Yvonne Honeycutt Baldwin pieces together Stewart’s 
life and her crusade against illiteracy. Although the book is presented as a chronologi-
cal account of Stewart’s role in the literacy movement, Baldwin intertwines with it 
broader themes of gender, politics, and education policy in the early twentieth century. 
The book begins with a detailed look at the “making of a reformer,” focusing on the 
people and experiences that shaped Stewart’s ideals and goals. Early in life, Stewart 
developed a strong belief that education was the key to economic mobility and partici-
pation in the benefits of modern life. In the second chapter, Baldwin recounts the birth 
of the Moonlight School movement. In the curriculum Stewart developed, after two 
six-week sessions of evening classes, participants would be able to sign documents, 
make basic mathematical calculations, write simple letters, and read a few verses of 
the bible. After several successful Moonlight School sessions, she embarked on a 
statewide promotional campaign in 1912. Ten counties immediately adopted 
Moonlight programs. Other counties, some in surrounding states, also began to exam-
ine the issue of illiteracy at her urging. Her experiences and the strong friendships and 
connections she had formed as a teacher and, later, county school superintendent 
proved indispensable in the burgeoning literacy campaign. 
Stewart’s struggles to obtain state funding for the Kentucky Illiteracy Commission 
(KIC), which she and other volunteers had worked to create in 1914, are described in 
the third chapter. These efforts, which were ultimately successful, resulted in the poli-
ticization of the literacy movement. Baldwin discusses Stewart’s growing involvement 
in Democratic Party state politics in great detail.  
The next two chapters recount the expansion of the literacy campaign to the national 
level. By 1919, only a few years into Stewart’s Moonlight campaign, the federal govern-
ment and 18 states had created illiteracy commissions that employed similar tactics (i.e., 
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evening adult classes and public awareness campaigns). Patriotic sentiment furthered the 
literacy efforts in Kentucky and across the country when it was discovered that over one-
fourth of the men called into military service in 1917 could neither read nor write.  
As Baldwin documents in the remaining chapters, the inability to sustain volunteer 
efforts and continual fundraising, changing priorities in adult education (e.g., Ameri-
canization programs), and growing demands for professional, institutionalized educa-
tion delivery would ultimately undermine the success of the grassroots literacy cam-
paigns. Despite her “failure” to eliminate illiteracy in a single generation, Stewart’s 
contributions to promoting literacy and adult education are undeniable. Ahead of her 
time in many ways, Stewart’s recognition of the importance of parents’ literacy in the 
educational progress of their children foreshadowed current literacy programs that 
emphasize literacy training for entire families.  
The obstacles that female reformers such as Stewart faced, in a period when oppor-
tunities outside of domestic circles were severely limited for women, is one of the 
book’s major themes. Baldwin emphasizes the challenges to women in finding “so-
cially acceptable ways of interacting in the . . . patriarchal bureaucratic systems” of 
politics and reform (p. 10). In particular, the efforts of female reformers to expand the 
limited scope of issues deemed valid concerns for women, the necessity for women to 
obtain the approval and assistance of powerful male politicians, and their frustration at 
limited opportunities for holding political office even after the passage of the nine-
teenth amendment, are all topics Baldwin addresses through Stewart’s experiences.  
Another major theme is the opposition that reformers had to overcome in the form of 
stereotypes and prejudices. For example, although it was commonly believed that learn-
ing was nearly impossible for older persons, blacks, and Native Americans, some of the 
Moonlight Schools’ most eager and successful students were members of these minori-
ties and older whites, who were well into their eighties in some cases. Stewart, like oth-
ers of her time, was able to use these counterexamples to argue for the extension of edu-
cation reform to address the needs of individuals of all races and nationalities. 
Although the book is filled with a number of other social themes, one final example 
is the changing nature of progressive activism during this era. Baldwin characterizes 
the progression of the literacy movement, like other reform efforts, from grassroots 
beginnings into more institutionalized social programs. Baldwin relates that reformers 
within both types of work viewed the other as a threat to their success.  
Economic historians in search of a highly quantitative description of literacy and 
education trends in Kentucky (or the South) may be disappointed. Nonetheless, I rec-
ommend this thorough account of the development of the Moonlight Schools and the 
literacy movement to anyone interested in the history of literacy and education activ-
ism in the United States. Baldwin successfully traces the literacy movement through 
the broader context of American history and provides a new perspective on the social 
and political climate surrounding education reforms during the Progressive Era. 
LINDA CARTER, Vanderbilt University 
The Democratization of Invention: Patents and Copyrights in American Economic 
Development, 1790–1920. By B. Zorina Khan. New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2005. Pp. Xvii, 322. $60.00. 
In this NBER monograph, Zorina Khan describes the evolution of thought on the 
subject of intellectual property in the United States from the early Federal period to 
1920 and compares the institutions that emerged with those that had been established 
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in Britain and France. An underlying theme is that the democratization of intellectual 
property rights, roughly interpreted as the widespread access of men and women from 
all walks of life to protection for their ideas, created an environment that promoted in-
vention and ultimately led to higher rates of economic growth. The term “democratiza-
tion” has recently itself become something of a “catch-all,” often used to represent 
some intangible social characteristics that may affect economic growth, political proc-
esses, credit markets, and a host of other outcomes. But here the author supplies sub-
stance to the notion by bringing to bear a wealth of information, both new and culled 
from her previous work, about the extent of patent applications, grants, and litigation 
in the United States. 
The result is a comprehensive account of how technological progress occurred at 
the grass-roots level. There are no sweeping “general purpose technology”-type events 
here, but rather a gradual progression of knowledge facilitated by a seemingly benign 
U.S. patent authority that allowed returns for innovative thinking to accrue not only to 
great inventors, but to creators of more mundane accomplishments as well. In contrast, 
the systems that evolved in Europe are characterized as being concerned with ensuring 
property rights for the elite. Although the European system may have reduced the 
number of trivial inventions passing through the patent authorities, it also tended to 
favor large technical inventions rather than other useful ones that did not require as 
much expertise. The author argues convincingly that the resulting intellectual property 
system did not fuel further invention as much as might have been possible.  
Khan proceeds to explore trends in patent litigation as well, concluding that courts 
in the United States were for the most part able to balance effectively between encour-
aging invention and not simply affirming indefinitely the market power of patent 
holders. In an interesting twist, she cautions against blind acceptance of the conven-
tional view that U.S. courts made somewhat arbitrary decisions when enforcing pat-
ents before the major legislation of 1836 and became more inventor-friendly thereaf-
ter. The main point is that restricting attention to actual court decisions can lead to 
inferences about patent stance that are based only on unrepresentative samples of ap-
parent infringements. By observing instead that earlier court decisions tended to be 
cited proportionally as much as later ones, the author demonstrates that a clear turning 
point in judicial attitudes towards patents across the mid-nineteenth century is 
unlikely. Rather, patent rights included in the original U.S. Constitution and their im-
plications for the democratization of invention were internalized by the courts 
throughout the first 130 years of the nation’s history. 
Two chapters on women inventors and the property rights of married women are 
among the more novel in the book. The author here points out that women could ac-
cess the U.S. patent system about as easily as men could, and shows that increasing 
numbers of women took advantage of it over time. Though based on small samples 
compared to the wealth of general patenting data analyzed in earlier chapters, Khan 
nonetheless offers evidence that the growth rate of patents granted to women became 
higher than that for men as the nineteenth century progressed. Such a result immedi-
ately raises questions of why this was the case. Were women simply becoming more 
creative relative to men? Or, perhaps more likely, did women increasingly overcome 
the financial barriers to obtaining patents, leading to the release of a backlog of good 
ideas? Or did women benefit from a legal environment that became more sympathetic 
to their claims? These questions are not addressed in any depth, with focus instead on 
how the household had become a locus of invention and innovation. Other researchers, 
however, will no doubt be motivated by these chapters to attempt to tackle some of 
these larger questions. 
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Khan also argues that the stance of the U.S. courts towards copyright infringements 
differed considerably from the systems existing in Europe. She portrays the United 
States as a leader in this regard, arguing that by not providing excessive protection to 
the contents of the printed page, the nation eased frictions that would otherwise have 
existed in the dissemination of knowledge. The emphasis on not depriving the public 
domain of important resources seems almost a forerunner of the democratization of 
knowledge encouraged by the internet today. 
I would recommend this book to anyone interested in a quantitative account of the 
path and patterns of technological change in the nineteenth-century United States. 
With a nearly exclusive focus on formal measures of innovation such as patents and 
copyrights, however, the forest never seems to come into full view. Indeed, a macro 
economist might even step away from the monograph with a view that innovation and 
technological change are incremental processes that are surprisingly well captured by 
the “A” parameter of standard growth models. But there are others, including this re-
viewer, who see technological changes as more lumpy processes that sometimes arrive 
with a flourish and offer new ways to think about the very act of inventing. Steam, in-
ternal combustion, and electrification may well be examples of such technologies. In 
this alternative world it is the importance of particular innovations and their associa-
tion with a leading new technology that matter for understanding how innovation af-
fects long-run outcomes, and these dynamics are not well captured by patent counts. 
More work may be able to integrate the two approaches, and I am confident that more 
strong contributions by this author and others will in the end achieve it. 
PETER L. ROUSSEAU, Vanderbilt University
Working the Navajo Way: Labor and Culture in the Twentieth Century. By Colleen 
O’Neill. Lawrence: The University of Kansas Press, 2005. Pp. xvii, 235. $29.95. 
In this interesting book Colleen O’Neill addresses a question that has received sur-
prisingly little attention: how did Indians adjust to economic changes in the twentieth 
century? Her subject is the Navajo tribe in the southwest. Too often studies ignore 
“Indian agency”—that is the active choices made by Indians. Indians are too often 
treated either as members of a traditional society to be studied before it disappeared 
through death or assimilation or as victims of the modern world. The author sums this 
up with a quote from a young Navajo woman who, on learning about her project, said 
“. . . that’s an important story to tell. Most people think we are silversmiths and 
drunks.” 
The author begins by discussing related literature in labor history and ethnic studies. 
A number of studies look at the formation of class consciousness as part of the evolu-
tion of the labor market, with special attention to the efforts to form unions. Indians 
receive little attention in this literature because they are seen as traditional and not a 
part the modern labor market. Ethnic historians are often concerned with how native 
peoples define themselves in relationship to the majority culture, usually without ref-
erence to the labor market. O’Neill wants to bridge the gap between the two fields in 
this book by looking at how the Navajo maintained their cultural identity in the paid 
labor market. Not surprisingly (but unfortunately) neither literature is informed by re-
search done by labor economists or economic history of the sort familiar to readers of 
this JOURNAL. Readers interested in applying economics to these events can easily do 
so for themselves, however.  
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Prior to the 1840s, Navajos had a well-deserved reputation as fierce warriors who 
raided other Indians and the Spanish. In 1863 the tribe was defeated by federal troops 
led by Kit Carson. The tribe was forced to move to a dismal reserve at Fort Sumner in 
New Mexico. When the Navajo returned to their original territory, members of the 
tribe adapted a peaceful way of life, and the tribe thrived and became more numerous. 
Families made a living by tending small herds of sheep and growing some crops. They 
also sold blankets and other hand made items to local trading posts, and a few men 
worked for wages with the railroad or as paid laborers in agriculture.  
The 1930s brought a major shock to the Navajo economy. The Bureau of Indian Af-
fairs (BIA), working with the newly formed Navajo tribal council, implemented a man-
datory program to reduce the number of Navajo sheep. Some families with small herds 
suffered the most from the proportional reduction in the number of sheep and had a hard 
time making a living. The program generated serious resentment by many Navajos to-
wards the newly created tribal government and the BIA. O’Neill (and others) is un-
doubtedly correct in criticizing the way it was carried out. But she does not suggest what 
might have been done instead. It appears that the tribe was headed to a crisis due to over 
grazing and ecological destruction as a result of rapid population growth in human and 
animal population and a “tragedy of the commons.”  
Navajo families responded in several ways. Some gathered coal that lay near the sur-
face to provide a new source of revenue, much the same way as they herded sheep. BIA 
officials saw these open pit “mines” as wasteful and inefficient, but it appears to O’Neill 
that the Navajo worked their mines with a keen eye to market conditions. Some worked 
in corporate mines, as well, doing lower paid “Indian” work above ground. 
Another important household activity was weaving. The hourly earnings were low, 
but Navajo women could combine this with other household activities and they were 
comfortable with the work. The sale of the blankets (a skill originally learned from the 
Spanish) was handled by trading posts, which the author criticizes for low payments, 
but which offered a familiar setting. Other household activities included making jew-
elry, growing crops, and maintaining herds of cattle and sheep. Families did not rely 
on one source of income, mixing farming, weaving, and wage work.  
Navajo men contributed by working for wages on and off the reservation. The big-
gest sources of employment were the Union Pacific Railroad or working on Mormon 
farms as laborers. In the 1950s the BIA tried to solve the problem of few jobs near 
reservations by urging Indians to move to cities. The stated goal was a permanent mi-
gration and assimilation of Indians into white culture. Navajo workers, of course, 
made their own choices, and many returned periodically to the reservation to partici-
pate in the household economy and more traditional cultural activities. According to 
O’Neill, “. . . To pull them into the labor market, commercial farmers, mining compa-
nies, and other western industrialists had to adjust to Navajos’ demands and figure out 
ways to accommodate culturally defined work practices” (p. 108). 
Another topic of interest to O’Neill is the relationship of Navajo workers to formal un-
ions. In the labor history literature, unions are typically seen as a positive force for workers. 
In the 1930s there were two miners unions, the United Mine Workers of America (UMWA), 
which represented the traditional (largely white) miners, and the National Mine Workers, 
which had ties to radical unions in Mexico and represented largely Hispanic miners. To both 
groups the Navajo were low-wage competition. Usually Indians were relegated to the lower 
wage, above ground jobs. John Collier and the BIA opposed unions in the 1930s, as did the 
Navajo Tribal council. O’Neill is “perplexed” by Collier’s opposition to the union, given 
previous statements in favor of unions, although she admits that “Perhaps he recognized that 
the UMWA was not, at that time, interested in the welfare of Navajo workers” (p. 121).  
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In the 1950s and later, some white workers in nearby towns saw Indians as even 
“lower” than blacks or Hispanics, and Indians were at times victims of what today 
would be called hate crimes. Unions remained problematic for Navajos, at times not 
operating in the best interests of Indians. More positively, in the 1960s there was a 
successful Indian led unionization effort among Navajo construction workers.  
In the end, Professor O’Neill argues against a simple dichotomy between traditional 
and modern. She also addresses issues in dependency theory and other debates in labor 
history and ethno history. Most importantly, the larger question addressed in this 
book—how Navajo people combined elements of both tradition and modernism in 
ways that made sense to them—stands on its own, and in this the author makes a use-
ful contribution.  
LEONARD CARLSON, Emory University 
GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS 
Global Capitalism: Its Fall and Rise in the Twentieth Century. By Jeffry A. Frieden. 
New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2006. Pp. xvii, 556. $29.95. 
Now that the book has been shut on the twentieth century, it perhaps comes as no 
surprise that scholars have begun to reflect more deeply upon the legacy of the past 
one hundred years. In Global Capitalism, Jeffry Frieden makes a pioneering attempt at 
spelling out the key economic and political events that shaped the global economy 
during the last century. The task he sets for himself is not an easy one as he must clear 
away much of the meddlesome brush that stands in the way of illuminating the histori-
cal path to the present, yet at the same time, preserve enough of the actors and events 
that define the path as a unique one. It also involves making critical decisions about 
the design of the rest of the garden: how much space should be allocated to shocks 
(such as the Great Depression and the World Wars) versus periods of continuity, and 
how many continental varietals should be allowed to bloom at any given time.  
The particular garden and path he has constructed is a familiar one, delineated by 
four epochs of the international financial system. The first section of the book (chap-
ters 1–5), entitled “Last Best Years of the Golden Age, 1896–1914,” provides an ac-
count of what is often referred to as the first era of globalization—the period between 
the late 1870s up to World War I when global trade and finance dramatically ex-
panded, the movement of (free) people around the globe became much more com-
monplace, and the classical gold standard operated as the linchpin for the system of 
global finance. The next five chapters describe the period from 1914 to 1939—when 
nations attempted to reconstruct their economies after World War I, resurrected an 
interwar variant of the gold standard, fell into economic depression, and searched for 
solutions to their economic woes by turning to fascism, communism, or autarky. As 
Frieden aptly labels this period, this is when “Things Fall Apart” for the global econ-
omy that had been constructed during the first epoch. The third section of the book 
(also five chapters) focuses on the period immediately following World War II up 
through the early 1970s. It describes how the global economy was reconstituted under 
the agreements reached at Bretton Woods. During this period, the United States as-
sumed a central role in economic management of the global economy, providing aid to 
the war-torn regions of the globe, encouraging nations to open their economies to 
trade, and anchoring the new gold-dollar standard of fixed exchange rates. The dra-
matic economic recovery of Europe and Japan, the spread of socialism, and the use of 
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import-substituting industrialization (ISI) policies in the developing world receive cen-
tral attention in this section. The last five chapters of the book describe the final three 
decades of the twentieth century, the massive factor flows that occurred across na-
tional borders, and the re-emergence of an integrated global economy. Emphasis is 
also given to the retreat of communism, the decline of ISI policies in the developing 
world, the explosive growth of the newly industrializing economies of East Asia, and 
the dramatic failure of other parts of the world (in particular, sub-Saharan Africa and 
parts of South Asia) to catch up with standards of living in OECD countries. 
Most economic historians will find the arguments of this book, as well as many of 
the details, quite familiar. Indeed, one of the book’s greatest strengths is that it pro-
vides a coherent and cohesive synthesis of the research in the subspecialties of interna-
tional and macroeconomic history, and nicely weaves together the work of Moses 
Abramovitz, Barry Eichengreen, Peter Temin, Alan Taylor, Kevin O’Rourke, Jeffrey 
Williamson, and many others. However, what is disappointing from a specialist’s per-
spective is that it offers little in the way of new findings or a boldly original perspec-
tive on the events of the twentieth century. Its main purpose appears to be to pull to-
gether the new international economic literature of the past 25 years and present it in 
one easily digestible volume. Other works, such as Globalizing Capital (Eichengreen, 
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996), Globalization and History 
(O’Rourke and Williamson, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1999) and the NBER vol-
ume, Globalization in Historical Perspective (edited by Michael Bordo, O’Rourke, 
and Williamson, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2003) reach similar con-
clusions concerning the past 130 years. As Frieden explains in Global Capitalism: (1) 
international trade, investment, and migration have followed a U-shaped pattern over 
the past 130 years; (2) falling transportation costs promoted factor price convergence 
in the two eras of globalization; and (3) a small club of countries has experienced phe-
nomenal rates of economic growth over the twentieth century and now shares similar 
living standards (convergence) while a large number of other countries have been left 
behind (economic divergence). That he reaches similar conclusions as others before 
him is not meant to diminish what Frieden has accomplished, as he has managed to tie 
all three of these themes together into one lively and readable book that nicely bal-
ances historical anecdote with economic generalization. There are a few places where 
Frieden could have provided more discussion (such as the transformation of the Allied 
economies during World War II), better balance (such as in the discussion of how the 
classical gold standard affected countries on the periphery), or greater emphasis (too 
little prominence is given to the role of banking crises in prolonging the Depression); 
but for the most part, these are minor sins of omission or commission.  
Given its structure (Global Capitalism has no tables or figures, and economic analy-
sis is kept to a minimum), this is a book that I would strongly recommend to nonspe-
cialists and students of political science and history. For those who teach international 
economic history, the book may prove somewhat challenging to integrate into syllabi 
aimed at economics students. When Frieden needs something from the economist’s 
toolkit (for example, Heckscher-Ohlin trade theory), he briefly provides a summary of 
the argument without allowing the narrative to get bogged down; but such discursions 
into theory are few and the relative strengths and weaknesses of competing viewpoints 
(for example, assessing the relative contributions of factor accumulation and technologi-
cal change compared to factor price equalization) are not addressed. Hence, the original 
economics or economic history articles, on which Frieden bases his argument, will per-
haps be of more interest to economics students who want to relate the history to theory 
and empirics. That said, Frieden excels at providing the political background to eco-
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nomic policymaking of the twentieth century (something that the aforementioned works 
in the same area do not develop nearly as well), so it is a pity that we have to even think 
about making such compromises on syllabi. Economics students would surely benefit 
from his command of politics and history. It also would be a shame if students missed 
out on Frieden’s neatly integrated, two- to three-page biographies of Nathan Mayer 
Rothschild, John Maynard Keynes, Hjalmar Schacht, Dean Acheson, and a few others 
that he views as having shaped the global economy of the twentieth century.
KRIS JAMES MITCHENER, Santa Clara University and NBER 
Renewing Unilever: Transformation and Tradition. By Geoffrey Jones. New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2005. Pp. xvii, 447. $64.50. 
Although Geoffrey Jones’s book covers a fairly short period—from 1965 to 1990—
it could not have been an easy history to write. Unilever is one of the world’s largest 
multinational conglomerates. Throughout much of its history it behaved more like a 
portfolio of businesses rather than a unified organization with a strong corporate iden-
tity. Even after rationalizing its businesses during the 1980s and 1990s, the scope of 
Unilever’s products remains broad. And the firm has an unusual dual governing struc-
ture, with headquarters in both London and Rotterdam.  
How does one tell the story of such a complex firm? To manage both the historical 
and thematic aspects, Jones divides his book into two parts. The first one-third or so 
chronicles Unilever’s history from 1965 to 1990. The rest of the book examines the 
firm’s “Dynamics and Routines,” including chapters on marketing and brands, emerg-
ing markets, and corporate culture. 
If the book has an overarching theme, it is Unilever’s protracted attempt to over-
come its historic aversion to acting cohesively. Unilever’s very origins militated 
against centralization. It began life as a multinational, the result of a 1929 merger be-
tween a group of Dutch companies and the United Kingdom’s Lever Brothers. (The 
dual-nation governing structure was set up primarily for tax purposes.) The firm grew 
through opportunistic acquisitions rather than organically. In the early twentieth cen-
tury, the need to secure a steady source of palm oil had led Lever Brothers into Africa, 
where Unilever eventually built an impressively large and diverse business, then 
southeast Asia. Later, Unilever’s tea interests pushed the firm into India. In stark con-
trast to rival Procter & Gamble (a comparative latecomer in the multinational arena), 
Unilever made little attempt to impose a “Unilever way” of doing business on its ac-
quired firms. There was, moreover, an understanding that the Dutch would not meddle 
with the British parts of the business, and vice-versa. The two parts of the company 
did not even communicate with one another much, save through the Special Commit-
tee. Aware of these shortcomings, the firm in the 1950s implemented a “Co-
ordination” program to better manage its product groups. But the program applied 
only to Europe and the United Kingdom, and coordinators were given the power only 
to advise and persuade. Unilever’s growing investment in the foods business also 
worked against centralization because markets for foods tend to be much more local-
ized than those for products such as detergents and personal care. 
Unilever was a prime example of a firm that was run through informal networks 
rather than by formalized, bureaucratic methods that would have allowed for a more 
analytical approach to yields and returns. Underperforming businesses were tolerated 
because few in the firm wished to judge performance solely by the criteria of net re-
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turn on sales, or return on capital employed. Strong-willed companies within Unilever, 
such as T.J. Lipton in the United States, succeeded in fending off any interference 
from London even when intervention was well justified. The United African Company 
subsidiary became a miniconglomerate in its own right and operated with almost com-
plete autonomy. Unilever’s strong respect for local autonomy resulted in an organiza-
tional structure based on nation rather than product. The structure was advantageous 
during crises such as World War II, but it proved much less so when Europe began to 
integrate, international competition grew keener, consumer tastes began to converge, 
and retailers and their private-label brands became more powerful. Extreme decen-
tralization kept the firm from achieving economies of scale and scope, hampered the 
transfer of knowledge among the different parts of the organization, and slowed the in-
ternationalization of its strongest brands. One might expect that decentralization would 
have fostered more innovation and “intrapreneurship,” but these did not become a 
strong part of the corporate culture either. 
Where the firm did succeed was in emerging markets. The strengths that Unilever 
cultivated—networks, informal methods, and national (rather than product) exper-
tise—served it well in volatile places such as Africa and South America. Jones treats 
this success as an anomaly, and here his business-school orientation and interest in in-
trafirm transfers of knowledge may have skewed his perspective somewhat. Certainly 
it would be difficult to craft a good business-school case study about how informal 
business and government networks, along with that slippery thing called “influence,” 
can play a critical role in a multinational’s success. And country-specific knowledge 
is, by its nature, not amenable to replication. Yet Unilever clearly had impressive 
skills in these areas, which probably deserve greater attention.  
In the mid-1980s, when terms such as synergy and core competency had become 
management buzzwords, and conglomerates grew increasingly vulnerable to leveraged 
buyouts, Unilever finally got serious. It shed noncore businesses along with its United 
Africa Company subsidiary. Simultaneously, the firm bolstered its cleaning, personal 
care, and foods businesses. By 1990 when this history ends, Unilever was still far from 
achieving its potential efficiencies. Its stock traded at a 20 percent discount to com-
petitors’, a reflection of the market’s dissatisfaction with the slow pace of restructur-
ing. (As of early 2006, the jury was still out on whether Unilever would succeed in 
growing its markets while continuing to improve operating margins.) 
A commissioned history is always a delicate balancing act between the needs of the 
commissioning organization and the professional standards of the scholar it authorizes to 
tell its story. Jones has balanced these tensions to write an impressively thorough and can-
did account of Unilever that will stand as the definitive history of the company during this 
period. Still, the book shows some of the limitations of a commissioned history, including 
a too-tight focus on the organization at the expense of larger historical developments—in 
this case the evolution of multinationals, of which Unilever was an early prominent ex-
ample. And because there are previous volumes covering Unilever’s history up to 1965 
(Charles Wilson, The History of Unilever: A Study in Economic Growth and Social 
Change. London: Cassell, 1954: Volume 1 and 2. New York: Praeger, 1968: Volume 3), 
Jones’s volume does not contain the whole story of how Unilever’s corporate DNA was 
created and embedded. To gain these broader perspectives, scholars should also read Wil-
son’s earlier volumes as well as Jones’s Multinationals and Global Capitalism: From the 
Nineteenth to the Twenty-First Century (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005). 
ROWENA OLEGARIO, Vanderbilt University
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The Natural Origins of Economics. By Margaret Schabas. Chicago: University of Chi-
cago Press, 2005. Pp. xi, 231. $40.00. 
A part of Margaret Schabas’s continuing research into the status of economics as a sci-
ence, this book argues that the economics of David Hume, the physiocrats, and the early 
classical school was grounded in physical nature, but that a trend toward what she calls 
the “denaturalization” of economics began with John Stuart Mill and continued unabated 
to the present day. Although Schabas focuses on the period that goes roughly from 1750 
to 1850, she extends her purview to Marshall and the neoclassical economists. The proc-
ess of replacing natural philosophy and natural theology with psychology and human 
agency as the conceptual bases of economics coincided with the birth of “the economy” as 
a new conceptual entity that can be manipulated to achieve socially desired ends. 
Schabas argues that economics, from the seventeenth century on, became more 
secular than other branches of science. Chapter 2 is devoted to developments in the 
natural sciences from the Greeks to Isaac Newton. The philosophers of the Enlighten-
ment were so impressed with Newton’s achievements that they tried to generalize 
them to the study of society and of the economy. Others based themselves on experi-
mental physics (including “subtle fluids” such as electricity and magnetism) and natu-
ral history. In the influential Oeconomy of Nature of 1749, the Swedish botanist Carl 
Linnaeus provided the first picture of an economy combining human activities with 
plants, animals and natural resources to show how their Creator arranged mutually 
supportive relations providing for their livelihood based on an equilibrium between 
them. He also promoted economics as a science, although his cameralist leanings led 
him to advocate autarky for Sweden, even with respect to tea and cocoa! 
French economics in the Enlightenment and thereafter is discussed in chapter 3. 
Schabas is on solid ground in arguing the overwhelming influence of natural laws on 
the birth of physiocracy, the first school of political economy whose very name signi-
fies “rule of nature.” The fact that its founder, François Quesnay, was a physician 
throws light on his authorship of the tableau économique, where the circular flow of 
economic activity among landowners, agricultural laborers, and the “sterile class” of 
manufacturers can be compared to the circulation of blood in the human body. The 
physiocrats considered agriculture as the only “productive” sector of the economy ca-
pable of yielding a surplus over its inputs. They applied the maxim of laisser faire to 
policy measures such as free trade in grains, and combined moral and physical laws 
under the rubric of “natural law.”  
Chapters 4 and 5 survey the two major eighteenth-century political economists in 
Britain, the Scots David Hume and Adam Smith. Although Schabas believes that “the 
case that he was well versed in and influenced by natural philosophy is a harder one to 
make with Hume than with Adam Smith” (p. 65), Hume’s scientific outlook can be 
gleaned from the many thought experiments found in his writings, such as the imme-
diate and ultimate impacts of sudden changes in the quantity of money in his essay 
“Of the Balance of Trade.” In elaborating the specie-flow mechanism, Hume drew the 
analogy of money with water, where both find their own level. He detected cycles of 
advance and decline in both the physical and moral realms, as illustrated by phases of 
economic growth and decline in different nations in the essay “Of Money.” According 
to Schabas, “there is enough circumstantial evidence . . . to suggest that Hume re-
garded economic processes as part and parcel of nature” (p. 78). Of course, if the term 
“nature” subsumes “human nature,” this is true by definition. If it does not, economic 
processes can be understood and explained only by taking into account historical and 
other forces that go well beyond nature itself. 
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Chapter 5 argues that Smith’s writings evidence manifold “debts to nature” that 
Schabas ascribes to his being well-read in natural philosophy, including its latest devel-
opments. In his essay on the “History of Astronomy,” Smith anticipated parts of T. S. 
Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific Revolutions by showing how Newton’s cosmology 
replaced those of Ptolemy, Copernicus, and Descartes. In both The Theory of Moral 
Sentiments (TMS) and The Wealth of Nations (WN) Smith resorted to metaphors drawn 
from natural philosophy, such as market prices “continually gravitating” toward “natural 
prices.” Schabas cites scholars who linked the key concept of “sympathy” in TMS to the 
force of gravity, while others linked it to the nervous system and human physiology. 
The human capacity for benevolence, like gravitational attraction, diminishes with dis-
tance. She points to the physicalist nature of “productive labor” in WN, which unlike 
unproductive labor “fixes” itself to vendible commodities. The very concept of equilib-
rium that characterizes markets in WN may derive from that observed by Linnaeus in 
animal species. Whereas these are apt observations, I find others less persuasive. To but-
tress her main thesis, Schabas calls the assertion in WN that agriculture is the most pro-
ductive sector of the economy an example of “Smith’s Physiocracy” and claims that 
“[t]he gift of nature could not be more sharply contrasted with the feeble efforts of hu-
man manufacturing” (pp. 94–95). She does not mention Smith’s devastating attack on 
several physiocratic doctrines (including their privileging agriculture as the only produc-
tive sector of the economy) in chapter 9 of Book Four of WN; nor the central importance 
of the division of labor throughout the WN, the fact that it is much more extensive in 
manufacturing than agriculture, and the widespread benefits of industrialization such as 
what Smith called “that universal opulence which extends itself to the lowest ranks of 
the people.” In sum, Smith’s “debts to nature” are not as extensive as Schabas claims. 
As shown in chapter 6, nature clearly played an important role in T. R. Malthus’s Essay 
on the Principle of Population of 1798. This is evident in the two main “fixed laws of our 
nature” cited in the Essay: that food is necessary to human existence, and that the “passion 
between the sexes” will continue and cause population to grow geometrically as long as 
food is available. Because the supply of food can at best grow arithmetically, nature or 
humankind must impose checks on population growth. Malthus diverged from both Smith 
and Ricardo by advocating self-sufficiency for Britain in agriculture. An important differ-
ence with Ricardo was Malthus’s sympathy with the landlord class and his advocacy of 
the Corn Laws that protected agriculture and enhanced rental income.  
Although Malthus’s work influenced that of David Ricardo, Schabas contends that in 
the latter’s writings nature plays a less significant role. Ricardo, however, argued that 
natural processes characterize manufacturing as much as agriculture, unlike Smith who 
held that in the former “nature does nothing; man does all.” In the diminishing returns to 
labor in agriculture, the powers of nature are revealed to decline over time, resulting in 
an increasing share of rental income going to the landlord class. In seeking to support 
her main thesis, Schabas goes too far when she claims that nature figures prominently in 
the principle of comparative advantage, where “Ricardo highlighted the importance of 
natural endowments and local climate in determining what each region of the world 
would produce most economically” (p. 116). The last sentence more aptly describes the 
trade theory based on factor endowments that Eli Heckscher and Bertil Ohlin enunciated 
a century later. International trade textbooks attribute Ricardian comparative advantage 
to technology rather than factor endowments. The sources of comparative advantage 
mentioned by Ricardo in his Principles of Political Economy and Taxation (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1951: 132) include, in addition to a country’s situation and 
climate, “its other natural or artificial advantages” (emphasis added). He often discussed 
the effects on trade of “improvements” in manufactures or in machinery, some of which 
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may even cause a reversal of comparative advantage (ibid.: 137–38). Human agency, in 
the form of discoveries and technical progress, and policy changes such as the liberali-
zation of trade in wage goods, figure prominently in Ricardo’s Principles. I also cannot 
agree with Schabas’s verdict that “Ricardo, like his predecessors, still privileges agricul-
ture over manufacturing” (p. 117). Most commentators have noted Ricardo’s champion-
ing of the manufacturing and capitalist classes, his invectives against the parasitic land-
lord class, and passionate advocacy of repeal of the protective Corn Laws.  
Whereas some commentators have labeled John Stuart Mill as an irresolute “half-
way house” economist who started but did not complete the transition from classical to 
neoclassical economics, Schabas identifies him in chapter 7 as the economist who 
abandoned the reliance on nature’s primacy implicit in the writings of his predeces-
sors, and embraced human agency and institutions as key determinants of economic 
activity. This “enabled him to reinforce the view that political economy is essentially a 
mental rather than a material science” (p. 127). The last part of chapter 7, and the final 
chapter 8, examine how the conceptual foundations of economics after Mill focused 
even further on the mental attributes of human agents at the expense of natural laws 
and physical processes. An initial fascination with the impact of human psychology on 
economic behavior on the part of W. S. Jevons, F. Y. Edgeworth, P. H. Wicksteed, 
and Alfred Marshall explains the importance of the individual agent in neoclassical 
theorizing. Psychological influences gradually gave way to the more positivist and 
analytical approaches of Irving Fisher and Paul Samuelson, to whom Schabas could 
have added Vilfredo Pareto and J. R. Hicks. Samuelson “even purged economic dis-
course of the concept of utility because it was too subjective” (p. 139).  
Economic historians may be especially interested in Schabas’s musings in chapter 8 
on the views of neoclassical economists on the irrelevance to their subject not only of 
natural processes, but of history and any type of evolutionary thinking, in contrast to 
their conspicuous role in classical times until J. S. Mill. As she says, “economists have 
embraced the view that bygones are always bygones, that the economy is always re-
creating itself and, hence, that the past does not matter” (p. 151). But is it true that, for 
the early neoclassical economists, human deliberations became “the proximate causes of 
all economic phenomena” and “[a]ny given price (for there is no longer a natural price) 
is essentially the result of hedonic balancing rather than of labor inputs” (p. 152)? Mar-
shall stressed that both supply and demand are needed to determine prices, making the 
famous analogy between them and the two blades of a scissors, both necessary to cut a 
piece of paper. The natural price of Smith and Ricardo became Marshall’s “normal” or 
long-run price representing the cost of production, grounded in the current technology 
and hence in physical processes rather than any “hedonic balancing.”  
Schabas’s book is the product of a deep, lengthy, and excellently documented en-
quiry into the natural origins of economics, which she convincingly demonstrates. 
More controversial is her argument that economics became “denaturalized” with Mill 
and after him. Just as both demand and supply considerations help to determine prices, 
I would argue that both nature and human agency (though in different proportions over 
time) have played some role in the systems of economics that have evolved since mer-
cantilist times. This book should encourage further research on an important topic in 
the intellectual history of the social sciences. 
ANDREA MANESCHI, Vanderbilt University
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